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COOPER v UNION BANK. CALIFORNIA PROTECTS
THE TRUE OWNER AGAINST A FORGED IN-
DORSEMENT DESPITE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE SECTION 3-419(3)
In any event, I would say that this was one of those areas
m which no three people could lead you out of the confusion that
you must now be m, and that if you have a problem like this,
the law is very unclear.i
E. Allan Farnsworth
In Cooper v Union Bank2 California has reaffirmed its tradi-
tional rule that a collecting bank 3 is liable to the true owner4 of a
1. ALI, ADVANCED ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY ON BANKING AND SECURED
TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFO M COMMERCIAL CODE 57 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as ALI-ABA COURSE OF STtrDY].
2. 9 Cal. 3d 371, 507 P.2d 609, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973). The opinion was
written by Mr. Justice Mosk for a unanmous court.
3. Definition of a few terms will aid in understanding the issues discussed. The
definitions are taken from the Uniform Commercial Code, CAL. COMM. CODE § 4105
(West 1964)"
"Depositary bank"--the first bank to which an item is transferred for collection
even though it is also the payor bank.
"Payor bank"-a bank by which an item is payable as drawn or accepted.
"Intermediary bank"--any bank to which an item is transferred in course of col-
lection except the depositary or payor bank.
"Collecting bank"--any bank handling the item for collection except the payor
bank.
"Presenting bank"--any bank presenting an item except a payor bank.
"Remitting bank"-any payor or intermediary bank remitting for an item.
From the above definitions it can be seen that the categories of banks set out are
not all mutually exclusive. For example, a payor can also be a depositary, but a payor
cannot be a collecting bank. An intermediary is always a collecting bank, but cannot
be either a depositary or payor. A collecting bank may be either a depositary or inter-
mediary. (COnsideration of the two additional categories, "presenting bank" and re-
mitting bank" is not necessary in the context of this note.) Any given bank will be
one of these four possible combinations, in the context of a single transaction: depos-
itary-collecting bank, depositary-payor bank, non-depositary payor bank, intermediary-
collecting bank.
In addition, the following terms are generally defined:
"Payee"-party to whom item is made payable.
"Drawee bank"--the bank upon which the item is drawn.
"Drawer"--the party that draws the item.
"Order mstrument"-an instrument made payable to the order of a specified per-
son, negotiable only by delivery with indorsement. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§§ 3-110, 3-202(1).
4. 'True owner" is the original payee of the check, or any subsequent mdorsee
prior to the forgery who may assert a claim for conversion of the instrument.
[7153
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check if it remits funds on a forged indorsement.5 The only defense
the bank may assert is that the true owner is estopped from pleading
the forgery by his negligence. In so holding, California has rejected
the nearly unanimous assumption in other jurisdictions and in commen-
tary that the bank's liability may, in certain cases, be limited by Uni-
form Commercial Code section 3-419(3) to the amounts received by
it on collection of the check which it has not yet remitted to its
transferor.
Section 3-419(3) reads:
Subject to the provisions of this Act concerning restrictive
indorsements 6 a representative, including a depositary or collect-
ing bank, who has in good faith and in accordance with the rea-
sonable commercial standards applicable to the business of such
representative dealt with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf
of one who was not the true owner is not liable in conversion or
otherwise to the true owner beyond the amount of any proceeds
remaining in his hands.7
Prior to Cooper, all the leading commentary, and dicta in every re-
ported case involving section 3-419 had interpreted the subsection as
absolving a collecting bank from liability to the true owner of a check,
in remitting funds over a forged indorsement, if it had (1) acted
in good faith, (2) acted in accord with reasonable commercial stand-
ards, and (3) paid out all the proceeds of the check to the forger or
subsequent indorsee. These three criteria, collectively, have become
known as the "defense" of section 3-419(3). 8  Only one case, Ervin v.
Dauphin Deposit Trust Co.,9 had held to the contrary, that the pre-
sumed "defense" never applies to a collecting bank remitting funds
on a forged indorsement. The California Supreme Court in Cooper
thus becomes the first high court in the forty-nine states which have
adopted the Code to offer a definitive ruling on this subsection.
Cooper will very likely provoke a spate of adverse criticism for its in-
5. "Forgery" in the context of this note means any unauthorized signature, as
defined in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(43): "'Unauthorized' signature or
indorsement means one made without actual, implied or apparent authority and includes
a forgery." The significance of an unauthorized signature is set forth in UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-404(1): "Any unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as
that of the person whose name is signed unless he ratifies it or is precluded from deny-
ing it...." The forged signature of the indorser is of primary interest in this note
and should be distinguished from the forged signature of the drawer. Payment by any
bank on a forged indorsement constitutes a conversion of the instrument under UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-419(1)(c).
6. For a discussion of this proviso, see note 40 infra.
7. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-419(3). The California provision is prac-
tically identical with the official text, although the comments differ. CAL. COMM.
CODE § 3419(3) (West 1964).
8. See, e.g., commentary cited in note 30 infra.
9. 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 473 (C.P. Dauphin Co. 1965), discussed at note 68 infra
and text accompanying notes 68, 74, 75 & 80 infra.
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terpretation of 3-419(3). Some of the criticism will be merited, for
some of the court's reasoning is not as clearly and directly expressed
as it could be. On the whole, however, the decision can be defended
in view of both the subsection itself and its comments---especially the
California comments.
In order to understand the policy which the section sets forth,
and subsequently to evaluate the holding in Cooper, it is first neces-
sary to understand the pre-Code liability which the common law
placed on collecting and depositary banks and the liability it placed on
a broker-agent for conversion. It will be shown that section 3-419-
(3) combines elements of these two doctrines to reach an ambiguous
result. Cooper found the combination confusing and attempted to clar-
ify the section's meaning insofar as the section bears on the problem
of collecting bank liability in conversion.
Common Law Bases of Liability
Common Law Liability of Collecting Banks
Professor Friedrich Kessler has summed up the historical attitude
of the Anglo-American common law toward liability for forged in-
dorsements in the following short paragraph:
[T]he protection given to the true owner of an order in-
strument against the loss of the instrument by reason of a forgery
of his signature is complete. He may proceed either against the
subsequent purchaser who has collected the proceeds, or against
the acceptor and, possibly, even against the drawee who has paid
the instrument to the wrong party, or finally, in case of dishonor,
against prior secondary parties. It is obvious that the American
rule is designed to place the ultimate liability upon the purchaser
from the forger. 10
This Anglo-American attitude is in sharp contrast with the position
taken by the continental law, which exonerates the transferee hold-
ing the instrument in good faith and without gross negligence' and
thereby shifts the burden of loss to the true owner.
The common law placed liability on the collecting bank under
several different theories:12 (1) in assumpsit, for money had and re-
ceived, (2) in conversion, (3) an election between assumption and
conversion, (4) strict liability, and (5) unjust enrichment. The ac-
tion most commonly used in California has been that of assumpsit.15
10. Kessler, Forged Indorsements, 47 YALE L.J. 863, 880 (1938) [hereinafter
cited as Kessler]. This article is cited in Cooper, 9 Cal. 3d at 376, 507 P.2d at 613,
107 Cal. Rptr. at 5. It appears that the court has looked closely at Professor Kess-
ler's comparative study of the policies underlying the continental and common law ap-
proaches to forged indorsements.
11. Kessler, supra note 10, at 863-64.
12. See cases collected at Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 670 (1965).
13. E.g., Morgan v. Morgan, 220 Cal. App. 2d 665, 34 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1963);
Briefly, the theory is this: when the true owner sues the collecting
bank, he ratifies the collection of the proceeds of the item by the col-
lecting bank from the payor bank, but does not ratify the payment
by the collecting bank to the forger. The true owner then holds the
collecting bank accountable for the funds it has received from the
payor bank and wrongly paid out to the forger.14 Typical of the
rigidity of the common law approach is the following language from
a Colorado case,' 5 cited by the California District Court of Appeals:
[T]he payee can recover from a bank which accepted [the
checks] from the forger and collected them from the drawee bank,
as for moneys had and received, even though it has fully paid over
and accounted for the same to the forger without knowledge or
suspicion of the forgery.1 6
Occasionally, the common law rule was phrased in terms of abso-
lute liability; for example, "[o]ne who acts upon the indorsement
of negotiable paper must ascertain its genuiness at his peril."1 7  The
liability was generally not so absolute as this language suggests, how-
ever. The transferee could assert some defenses, including the negli-
gence of the payee, to bar recovery. 8 These defenses always required
a showing of some culpability on the part of the true owner, in con-
trast to the simpler, stronger defense given by the continental law to
the transferee: good faith, absence of gross negligence.
The common law also allowed any transferee of an instrument
bearing a forged indorsement to recover from his immediate trans-
feror; a payor or intermediary bank could recover from a prior inter-
mediary or depositary bank on the standard guarantee of prior indorse-
ments or otherwise recovered under the common law theory of payment
by mistake.' 9 The depositary bank could, in turn, recover under the
Jones v. Bank of America, 49 Cal. App. 2d 115, 121 P.2d 94 (1942); Walsh v. Amer-
ican Trust Co., 7 Cal. App. 2d 654, 47 P.2d 323 (1935); George v. Security Trust
& Say. Bank, 91 Cal. App. 708, 267 P. 560 (1928).
14. This is the "ratification" theory which was followed by the court in Cooper.
See text accompanying notes 52-55 infra for a more complete discussion of this the-
ory.
15. United States Portland Cement Co. v. United States Nat'l Bank, 61 Colo.
334, 336, 157 P. 202, 203 (1916).
16. George v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 91 Cal. App. 708, 710, 267 P. 560
(1928).
17. Walsh v. American Trust Co., 7 Cal. App. 2d 654, 658, 47 P.2d 323, 324
(1935).
18. See Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 638 (1963) (Payee's prior negligence facilitating
forging of indorsement as precluding recovery from bank paying check); Annot., 39
A.L.R.2d 641 (1955) (When depositor-drawer of check is "precluded", under Negotia-
ble Instruments Law, § 23, from setting up forgery of indorsement or want of authority
against drawee bank).
19. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 65; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-207,
Comment 2; see Wells Fargo Bank v. Bank of Italy, 214 Cal. 156, 4 P.2d 781 (1931).
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warranty from the forger if it could find him.20 The practical result was
to place final liability on the depositary bank, which was better able to
institute procedures to ascertain the genuineness of an indorsement
than other parties because of the directness of its contact with the
forger.
21
Common Law Liability of a Broker-Agent for Conversion
The second of the two common law doctrines which appear to
be incorporated into section 3-419(3) is the common law liability of
an agent (representative) for the torts of his principal. The general
rule is that the innocent agent is liable for conversion when he disposes
of goods for his principal, even though the agent has acted in good
faith and no longer exercises control over the converted goods. 2 The
common law extended a special exemption from liability in conver-
sion to a broker who dealt with stolen negotiable bonds or securities
on behalf of his principal, remitting all the proceeds from the sale of
the paper to this principal. For example, the Massachusetts case of
Pratt v. Higginson, s citing an earlier case of Spooner v. Holmes," ex-
empted members of a banking-brokerage firm who had in good faith
and without notice disposed of United States bonds for a thief, re-
mitting the proceeds to the thief. Later cases adopted the exemp-
tion,2 ' absolving the innocent representative. This standard for be-
havior is similar to the defense allowed to the transferee of a forged
indorsement under the continental rule-good faith action without gross
negligence.
These broker cases are subject to two different interpretations
with regard to the possible scope of the exemption granted. The first
and generally accepted interpretation is that the exemption from lia-
bility in conversion is limited to circumstances in which the broker
20. To simplify discussion of bank liability for forged indorsements, it is assumed
throughout this note that the forger deals directly with the depositary bank. In situa-
tions where the forger deals with an innocent second party, who in turn transfers the
check to the depositary, the warranty still applies as against the innocent customer,
and liability ultimately rests with the customer if the forger cannot be reached. UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-417 & 4-207 provide the warranties on presentment or
transfer extended by any person or collecting bank.
21. "[A] elaborate protection for the true owner, with exceptions in only a lim-
ited number of instances, has been built upon a philosophy designed to place ultimate
liability upon the purchaser who took from the forger." Kessler, supra note 10, at
872.
22. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 84-86 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 349 (1958); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 233 (1965).
23. 230 Mass. 256, 119 N.E. 661 (1918).
24. 102 Mass. 503 (1869).
25. E.g., Gruntal v. National Sur. Co., 254 N.Y. 468, 173 N.E. 682 (1930); First
Nat'l Bank v. Goldberg, 340 Pa. 337, 17 A.2d 377 (1941).
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markets only bearer paper. The Restatement (Second) of Torts de-
fines and delimits the broker exemption in terms of the "holder in due
course" doctrine.2" According to the comments and illustrations to
section 233(4) the broker would not be protected under common law
if he innocently received and sold negotiable instruments bearing
forged indorsements.2 7  The Restatement (Second) of Agency takes a
similar position.28 Under the second interpretation the cases should
be read more broadly to grant the exception whenever a broker
markets any negotiable instrument. The argument for a broader
interpretation is this: Although all the instruments involved in these
broker cases were bearer bonds or securities, negotiable by delivery
alone without indorsement, the rationale for the exemption does
not turn on whether the instrument converted was an order in-
strument or a bearer instrument. The rationale for the exemption is
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 233(4) (1965): "The statement in
Subsection (1) [that one who as agent of another person disposes of a chattel is liable
for a conversion to another who, as against his principal, is entitled to the immediate
possession of the chattel] is not applicable to an agent or servant who disposes of
current money, or a document negotiable by common law or by statute, pursuant to
a transaction by which the transferee becomes a holder in due course of such money
or document, unless the agent or servant knows or has reason to know that his prin-
cipal or master does not have authority so to dispose of it."
For the requirements of becoming a holder in due course, see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE §§ 3-302 to 3-305.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 233(4), Comments d & e, Illustrations
5 & 6 (1965) reads:
"d. The statement in this Subsection is applicable only when the transferee receives
the instrument under circumstances which make him a holder in due course. If, for
any reason, the transferee fails to obtain title to the instrument, the agent or servant
who negotiates it either by indorsement or delivery is subject to liability to the person
entitled to the immediate possession of the instrument for its conversion.
Illustrations:
5. A employs B, his broker, to sell certain bonds payable to bearer. B sells the
bonds to C, and delivers them pursuant to the sale. C knows that A has stolen the
bonds from D, but B is ignorant of this fact. B is subject to liability to D.
6. A employs B, his broker to sell certain bonds payable to order. B sells the
bonds to C, and delivers them pursuant to the sale. Both B and C are ignorant of
the fact that A had stolen the bonds and forged the name of D, the last indorsee.
B is subject to liability to D.
e. Rationale. The statement in Subsection (4) is consistent with the policy of the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, the Uniform
Warehouse Receipts Act and the Uniform Commercial Code. The policy of all of
this legislation is directed toward insuring the marketability of the documents in ques-
tion by protecting one who obtains them as a holder in due course. The rule stated
in this Section enhances the marketability and the easy exchange of credits by affording
a similar protection to those who deal with negotiable securities on behalf of a prin-
cipal."
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 349 (1958). See id., Appendix, Rep.
Notes at 576.
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to enhance the marketability of negotiable bonds and securities, 2 and
the more inclusive term "negotiable instrument" is often used in these
cases, instead of the narrower one, "bearer instrument." Read re-
strictively, the cases exempt only brokers dealing with bearer paper;
read more broadly, the cases would exempt the broker to preserve
his role as marketing agent for order as well as bearer paper, and the
exemption could therefore extend to protect the broker who dealt
with order paper bearing forged indorsements. The difference in the
two interpretations becomes significant when one attempts to analyze
section 3-419(3) in terms of the broker exemption.
A comparison of the broker-agent rule with the common law rule
on the liability of collecting banks for forged indorsements shows two
distinctly different concepts operating. The true owner of a market-
able negotiable instrument had his rights subordinated to the inno-
cent broker-agent who dealt with the instrument, but the true owner
of an order check had rights superior to any bank which took the
check for collection, absent negligence on the owner's part.
Section 3-419: the pre-Cooper Analysis
At the time Cooper reached the California Supreme Court the con-
sensus among legal scholars,30 with support in dicta from the courts,
31
29. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Goldberg, 340 Pa. 337, 343, 17 A.2d 377, 380
(1941): 'The purpose of the Negotiable Instruments Law is to enhance the market-
ability of such securities and to allow bankers, brokers, and people generally to trade
in them with confidence. That object would be defeated if liability were to be imposed
upon one who, mistakenly but in good faith, deals with negotiable instruments on the
assumption that they belong to the person who employs him to effect their sale through
ordinary market channels."
30. E.g., ALI ABA COURSE OF STUDY, supra note 1, at 56-57. Mr. Leary con-
cluded that § 3419(3) would protect a depositary if it took the check for collection
and gave the transferor a provisional credit, but would not protect the depositary or
collecting bank if the transferor received cash for the check, for in the latter case
the bank pays out its own money to purchase the check and does not act as a rep-
resentative for collection.
H. BA LEY, TAE LAW OF BANK CHEcs § 15.14, at 499 (4th ed. 1969) (footnotes
omitted). "The Code would appear to [provide] that a depositary or collecting bank
which collected a check on a forged indorsement and remitted the proceeds to its prior
transferor is not liable in conversion to the true owner."
8 CAL. JuR. 2d, Bills & Notes § 260, at 487 (1968) (footnotes omitted). "[§
3419(3)] should have the effect of excusing from liability to the payee a bank cashing
or collecting a check bearing a forged payee's indorsement, where no proceeds of the
check remain in the bank's possession, and where the bank has dealt with the forger
in a 'commercially reasonable' manner."
B. CLARK & A. SQUILLANTE, THE LAW OF BANK DEPosrrs, COLLECTIONS AND
CREDIT CRDs 144 (1970). "[A] collecting bank which does not 'cash' the check is
protected from a conversion action by § 3-419(3), which recognizes that such a bank
is a mere agent handling the check for its principal. . . . A strong argument can
be made that a bank which 'cashes' a check, [however, should not be allowed to assert
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was that the collecting bank had been given a new, strong defense in
the defense of § 3-419(3)]."
2 F. HART & W. WILLIER, COMMERCIAL PAPER UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE § 12.38[3], at 12-142 (1972). "[A bank which cashes a check] would
not be exempt in any way from liability .... In strictly collection cases, the issue
resolves itself into whether the bank paid the instrument in good faith and in accord-
ance with reasonable commercial standards."
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 502 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS]. "For reasons
not too clear to us the draftsmen have attempted to free depositary banks from con-
version liability in a substantial number of cases. . . . [If the forger deposits the
check in his own account, and does not withdraw it,] the depositary bank still has
the 'proceeds' and will be liable. To the extent it pays cash over the counter to the
thief it has no proceeds."
White, Some Petty Complaints About Article Three, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1315, 1333
n.58 (1967). "[Blanks in the collecting chain will usually have no liability for dealing
with a stolen check [citation omitted]; there is some doubt, however, as to whether
'representative' includes [those] who simply cash a check over a forged instrument or
whether the term is limited to banks in the chain of payment."
Note, Allocation of Losses from Check Forgeries under the Law of Negotiable
Instruments and the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 YALE L.J. 417, 471 (1953). "[§
3-419(3)] gives a collecting bank who exercises reasonable care a defense against the
payee for the amount of any proceeds not remaining in the bank's hands."
31. FDIC v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 431 F.2d 341, 344 (5th Cir. 1970). The court
assumes the defense is available, but not in the case at bar, since by the bank's own
admission it had failed to comply with its own commercial standards.
Allied Concord Fin. Corp. v. Bank of America, 275 Cal. App. 2d 1, 8, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 622, 626 (1969) (dictum). "[I1f a collecting or depositary bank has proceeds
of a forgery in its possession under section 3419(3) it may become liable to the true
owner . . . for the amount of proceeds remaining in its hands." (Drawer was not
allowed to bring an action directly against collecting bank.)
Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1, 6,
184 N.E.2d 358, 361 (1962) (dictum). "[W]e assume that the collecting bank may
be liable in conversion to a proper party, subject to defences, including that in § 3-
419(3)." (Court denied drawer the right to bring action directly against collecting
bank.)
Salsman v. National Community Bank, 102 N.J. Super. 482, 493, 246 A.2d 162,
168 (L. Div. 1968), aff'd 105 N.J. Super. 164, 251 A.2d 460 (App. Div. 1969). "[§
3-419(3)] clearly implies the liability of a depositary or collecting bank in conversion
when it deals with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who is not the
true owner, where the bank does not act in accordance with 'reasonable commercial
standards.'" (Recovery allowed, since defendant bank had not acted in accordance
with these standards.)
Belmar Trucking Corp. v. American Trust Co., 316 N.Y.S.2d 247, 251, 253 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1970). "[§ 3-419(3)], which is new, is an exculpatory proviso, relieving a
depository or collecting bank from liability in the event that it acts 'in good faith and
in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards applicable to the business' of
the bank. . . . The full measure of the collecting bank's relief from responsibility
[under § 3-419(3)] is set forth in the language .... ." (Collecting bank held liable
because it had violated reasonable commercial standards.)
In none of the above cases was the court faced with a collecting bank which had
acted in accord with reasonable commercial standards. The assumed "defense" was
therefore never applied to relieve any collecting bank from liability to the true owner.
[Vol. 25
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section 3-419(3). One case had held to the contrary,3 2 and at least one
commentator had raised serious questions as to the meaning of the
section.33  The consensus was this: section 3-419, correctly interpre-
ted, gives the true owner the right to sue the payor in conversion for
paying on a forged indorsement, and at the same time mitigates the
common law liability of the collecting bank to the true owner where
the bank has acted in good faith, without negligence (in accord with
reasonable commercial standards), and where the bank no longer
retains the proceeds of the check. In a sense, a standard for liability
similar to that of the continental law, modified by the proceeds provi-
sion, would replace the common law liability of collecting banks. The
right to recover from the collecting bank would be preserved under the
Code's warranty34 provisions so that a payor found liable in conversion
to the true owner could recoup the loss it had sustained in remitting the
proceeds to the collecting bank.3 5 The net result of this rearrangement
of liabilities would be to limit the true owner's cause of action to the
payor bank; ultimate liability would still remain upon the depositary-col-
lecting bank for breach of warranty of the indorsement. The collecting
bank would be freed from any simultaneous liability to the payee in con-
version and to the payor in warranty.
It is possible to analyze section 3-419(3) into its component
parts based on the common law and to see how the section could be
interpreted as broadening the common law broker exemption and as ex-
tending it to new parties in arriving at the scheme of liabilities as
set forth immediately above. The official comment to section 3-419-
(3) states that its purpose is
32. Ervin v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 473 (C.P. Dau-
phin Co. 1965). Ervin reached the same conclusion as does Cooper, that § 3-419(3)
does not allow the collecting bank a defense. The fact situation is similar to that
in Cooper. See text accompanying notes 68, 74 & 75 infra and note 68 infra for
comparison of the two cases and commentary on Ervin.
33. See Britton, Defenses, Claims of Ownership and Equities-A Comparison of
the Provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law with Corresponding Provisions of
Article 3 of the Proposed Commercial Code, 7 HASTINGS LJ. 1, 45-46 (1955). Pro-
fessor Britton points out a number of confusing ambiguities in the wording of the sec-
tion and foreshadows the difficulty of interpreting the term "proceeds:"
"[Who is the 'true owner'? Is this a reference to the 'true owner' of the in-
strument or the 'true owner' of the proceeds? They are not the same. The drawee
is the 'true owner' of the proceeds and the holder is the 'true owner' of the check.
"It is not apparent why the unusual phrasing---'A representative, including a de-
positary or collecting bank'-is used in the section. The problem concerns the liabil-
ity of the person who got the money under the forged indorsement from the drawee.
This could be the forger, or a purchaser from the forger or someone who collects in
behalf of the forger, or other purchaser or an agent thereof. This idea could be more
simply and more clearly expressed than it is."
34. UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE § 4-207.
35. Id. § 3-419, Comment 6, indicates that this liability is to be preserved.
to adopt the rule of decisions which has held that a representative,
such as a broker or depositary bank, who deals with a negotiable
instrument for his principal in good faith is not liable to the true
owner for conversion of the instrument or otherwise, except that
he may be compelled to turn over to the true owner the instru-
ment itself or any proceeds of the instrument remaining in his
hands. The provisions of subsection (3) are, however, subject to
the provisions of this Act concerning restrictive indorsements.
36
The first sentence of the comment could be interpreted as an indica-
tion that the drafters intended to grant the broker-agent exemption,37
in some form or another, to despositary and collecting banks. The
question then arises whether the drafters in adopting the rule of
the broker-agent decisions3 s and extending it to collecting banks,
intended to use a broad interpretation of the rule to apply the
exemption to all negotiable instruments 9.3  Further, and more im-
portantly, did the drafters mean to extend the rule to collecting
banks dealing with order instruments in the normal check collection
process as well as in the role of broker? The answers to these ques-
tions are not clear from the first sentence of the comment.
The second sentence of the comment, however, seems to give a
better answer to the question as to whether order paper is meant to be
included in the exemption. Here, as well as in section 3-419(3) it
self, the drafters make clear that the exemption granted is subject to
the restrictive indorsement provisions in the Code.4" It would make
no sense to include a restrictive indorsement exception to the exemp-
tion if the exemption itself did not deal with indorsements. Following
this line of argument the explanation for this exception would be that
depositary and collecting banks are not liable in conversion to the
true owner (if they act in good faith, in accord with reasonable com-
mercial standards, and retain no proceeds) unless they remit the funds
36. Id., Comment 5.
37. See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
38. E.g., Pratt v. Higginson, 230 Mass. 256, 257, 119 N.E. 661, 662 (1918).
39. Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-318, which extends a similarly broad
exemption to agents and bailees who innocently deal with converted securities on be-
half of a principal. Although the comment to § 8-318 indicates that the rule of Grun-
tal v. National Sur. Co., 254 N.Y. 468, 173 N.E. 682 (1930) is being followed, the
Code exemption is clearly broader than is indicated in the case. See also UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-404, which exempts an innocent bailee from liability for good
faith delivery pursuant to the terms of a document of title.
40. These provisions are found in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-205, 3-206,
& 3-419(4). A common example of a restrictive indorsement is "for deposit only."
The effect of these provisions is to hold the first taker (e.g., depositary bank) abso-
lutely liable to the indorser if it does not follow the instructions of the restrictive in-
dorsement, but to relieve subsequent transferees or indorsees from liability for conver-
sion in the event the first taker does not apply the funds consistently with the restric-
tive indorsement.
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as immediate transferees in disobedience to an express restrictive in-
dorsement. For example: forger steals a check made out to Corpor-
ation X, indorses the check with the Corporation's "for deposit only"
stamp, signs his own name under the corporation indorsement, and re-
quests cash from the teller of a depositary-collecting bank. If the
teller gives him the cash, the bank will be liable to the true owner
(Corporation X) in conversion, since it cannot assert the "defense" of
section 3-419(3) in disobedience of the restrictive indorsement. If
the exemption were meant to apply only in the case of bearer paper,
there would be no need to limit the exemption by the restrictive in-
dorsement proviso.
A liberal reading of the broker cases and the inclusion of the re-
strictive indorsement proviso in section 3-419(3) both support the ar-
gument that the exemption granted must include order paper. The
question remains as to whether collecting banks are exempt in the or-
dinary check collection transaction. The majority interpretation as-
sumes that they are, although this would entail a substantial depar-
ture from the common law of commercial paper, as we have seen.
Cooper holds that they are not exempt.
Cooper v. Union Bank
Bernice Ruff was employed as secretary and bookkeeper by Jo-
seph Stell. Over a period of eighteen months, Miss Ruff appropriated
twenty-nine checks intended for Stell either personally or in his busi-
ness capacity, forged his indorsement on them, and cashed some of the
checks either at Union Bank or at Crocker Citizens National Bank (de-
positary-collecting banks). She also cashed two of the checks directly
at the payor bank, Crocker, which became a payor-depositary for those
transactions. She deposited the rest to her personal account at Crocker
and later withdrew the entire amount of these deposits before the for-
geries were discovered. Some of the checks were forwarded to and
paid by Crocker, Security First National Bank and First Western Bank
and Trust Company (payor banks); others were paid by banks not
parties to the action (also payor banks).
Stell and his partners brought an action in conversion against the
depositary-collecting banks and payor banks, under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, section 3-419(1)(c). 4 "  The trial court found that Stell
41. Stell's theory of recovery was this: the collecting banks converted the check
by paying on a forged indorsement, under CAL. COMM. CODE § 3419(1)(c) (West
1964), and did not act in accordance with reasonable commercial standards, and could
not therefore assert the "defense" of § 3419(3); or, alternatively, the payor banks con-
verted the checks and were not shielded by § 3419(3), which is limited by its terms
to "depositary and collecting banks." See Brief for Appellant, Cooper v. Union Bank,
103 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1972), rev'd in part, 9 Cal. 3d 371, 507 P.2d 609, 107 Cal. Rptr.
1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant].
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was negligent in failing to discover Ruffs misdeeds after six months
time and therefore was estopped from asserting these later forgeries
against both the collecting and payor banks. (When Stell hired Ruff,
he knew she was insolvent because of gambling losses. He subsequently
did not adequately supervise her bookkeeping.) With regard to the
forgeries which took place in the first six months, the trial court found
that all the banks had acted in good faith and in accord with reason-
able commercial standards, and were therefore shielded from liability
under section 3-419(3) because they had remitted all the proceeds to
Ruff. The payor banks were also extended the immunity because the
court concluded they had also acted as representatives within the
meaning of the statute.
42
In affirming the trial court's action, the court of appeals carefully
reviewed the evidence which showed adherence to "reasonable com-
mercial standards," and concluded that in every respect the banks had
acted reasonably under the circumstances.4 3  It then approved the use
of the "defense" in section 3-419(3), absolving the banks from lia-
bility. The court did not question the existence of such a defense,
nor did the plaintiff-appellant challenge this assumption in his argu-
ment, except in one short citation 44 to Ervin v. Dauphin Deposit Trust
Co.45 as maverick authority.
In reviewing the case, the California Supreme Court upheld the
finding of negligence, denying recovery on all checks misappropriated
after the six month period. 46 However, it allowed recovery from the de-
positary-collecting banks on the earlier checks by denying the avail-
ability of section 3-419(3) as a defense to the collecting banks with
regard to the checks transferred to them for deposit as well as those
cashed, since in both cases the bank had retained the proceeds. 7 The
42. This result, if affirmed, would have left the hapless true owner without any
remedy against the banks whatsoever.
43. "The bank's duty is not an absolute one of discovering a forgery, it is a
duty to take precautions which might disclose the forgery and which are reasonable
under the circumstances." 103 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
44. Brief for Appellant, supra note 41, at 7.
45. 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 473 (C.P. Dauphin Co. 1965).
46. 9 Cal. 3d at 383, 507 P.2d at 618, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 10. The court did
not reach the question of the payor banks' liability, since the checks at issue in the
action against the payor banks (as non-depositary payors) had been forged after the
six month period and Stell was therefore precluded by his negligence from asserting
these forgeries under § 3406. Id. at 385, 507 P.2d at 620, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 10. Since
the negligence defense of § 3406 is limited by its terms to payor banks, the court used
the common law estoppel doctrine (see text accompanying note 18 supra) as applied
through § 3404(1) (see note 5 supra) to allow the collecting banks the negligence
defense.
47. The commentators are divided as to when the bank retains proceeds upon
cashing a check. For example, Mr. Leary posits that when a bank cashes a check
over the counter, it pays out its own money and collects the proceeds later; it there-
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court reasoned on five grounds. (1) The collecting banks retained
the proceeds of the forged checks, remitting instead their own funds
to the transferor in cash or deposit credit. (2) A collecting bank
does not act as a true agent throughout the ordinary bank collecting
transaction, since its agency status ends on final settlement of the
item, and it becomes a debtor of the transferor. Section 3-419(3) is
addressed, not to this kind of transaction, but to the true agency situa-
tion. (3) Pre-Code law had held collecting banks liable to the true
owner in similar fact situations. Since liability ultimately rests with the
depositary-collecting bank under -the warranty provision of the Code,48
the legislature could not have intended an "uneconomical circuity of
action" contrary to the Code's purpose to simplify the commercial law,
and did not intend to deprive the true owner of his action directly
against the collecting bank. The effect of such a defense would be to
free the collecting bank of responsibility, requiring the true owner to
bear the loss because of the expense in bringing multiple suits against
payor banks, in situations like Cooper. The legislature could not have
intended such an unjust result. (4) California comments to the Code
indicate that section 3-419(3) is consistent with prior California law,
and that no drastic change from the former strict liability was con-
templated by the legislature. (5) Official Code comment indicates that
the section was not intended to be applied to the ordinary bank col-
lection transaction, but was designed to mitigate liability in conver-
sion for brokers and agents who market negotiable instruments in good
faith and remit the proceeds to their customers. The reasoning in
Cooper may be summarized into three main lines: analysis of the term
fore always retains the proceeds of such checks and cannot assert the "defense" of
section 3-419(3). Professor Farnsworth contends the "defense" is unavailable because
the bank in cashing the check has purchased the instrument, and is therefore not a
representative. ALI-ABA COURSE or Svuuy, supra note 1, at 56-57. Professors White
and Summers argue that to the extent, the bank pays cash to the forger it retains no
proceeds. WHIrrE & S MMEs, supra note 30, at 502. COoper specifically rejects any
distinction between checks cashed and checks deposited in ascertaining the liability of
the collecting bank. 9 Cal. 3d at 380 n.12, 507 P.2d at 616 n.12, 107 Cal. Rptr.
at 8 n.12.
48. UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-207, "Warrantins of Customer and Collect-
ing Bank on Transfer or Presentment of Items .... ." Under these provisions the
liability for wrongful payment will ultimately fall on the depositary-collecting bank in
situations like Cooper, even if the bank is not sued directly by the true owner in con-
version. Under the warranty provision, a collecting bank warrants the validity of a
prior indorsement upon transferring the check to the payor bank, and is liable to the
payor bank for breach of this warranty if the prior indorsement is shown to be forged.
If the true owner sues the payor bank under § 3-419(1)(c) in conversion, the payor
bank will in turn sue the collecting bank under § 4-207 for breach of warranty, and
the depositary-collecting bank will ultimately bear the loss, if the warranty claims are
made in a timely manner (§ 4-207(4) ) (assuming, of course, the forger cannot be
reached).
"proceeds," analysis of the relationship of the collecting bank to the
transferor, whether agent or debtor, and inquiry into legislative in-
tent.
Proceeds
The term "proceeds" is not defined either generally in Article 1 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, nor in the context of commercial paper
and banking transactions (Articles 3 and 4). "Proceeds" is defined,
however, in terms of security interests in personalty in Article 9.49 Ar-
ticle 3 incorporates certain definitions from Article 4 into its defini-
tions, as well as all the Article 1 definitions (which are of general
applicability throughout the Code), but it does not include the Arti-
cle 9 definition of proceeds.50 To be consistent with the definitional
scheme, the definition in section 9-306(1) should not be applied in the
context of commercial paper and the court has not done so. Still, this
definition does indicate that at least in terms of secured transactions
under the Code, "proceeds" covers a broad spectrum and tends to in-
clude any equivalent amount of personalty received by a party to a
transaction in exchange for other personalty. The definition in Black's
Law Dictionary includes the general phrase "value of property sold or
converted into money or other property." 51
Cooper arrives at a much narrower definition, in the context of
liability for forged indorsements. The court takes as its premise the
pre-Code bank collection theory that the proceeds of a check are only
those funds which are paid out of a drawer's account in accord with
his directions. 2  It then applies this theory to the Code scheme for
collection of order paper, in the following way: a check drawn payable
to "bearer"53 or to "cash" needs no indorsement, and is negotiated by
delivery alone. 4 A check drawn to "the order of" requires both de-
livery and an indorsement by the payee for negotiation 55 in compliance
49. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-306(1):
" 'Proceeds' includes whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or
other disposition of collateral or proceeds. Insurance payable by reason of loss or
damage to the collateral is proceeds, except to the extent that it is payable to a person
other than a party to the security agreement. Money, checks, deposit accounts, and
the like are 'cash proceeds.' All other proceeds are 'non-cash proceeds'."
50. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-102.
51. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1369 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) defines "proceeds" as
"[i]ssues; income; yield; receipts; produce; money or articles or other thing of value
arising or obtained by the sale of property; the sum, amount, or value of property
sold or converted into money or into other property."
52. 9 Cal. 3d at 376-77, 507 P.2d at 613, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
53. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(5): "'Bearer' means the person in
pcssession of an instrument, document of title, or security payable to bearer or indorsed
in blank."
54. Id. § 3-202(1).
55. Id.
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with the directions of the drawer. If the drawee bank pays an order
check on a forged indorsement, it has not followed the instructions of
the drawer, and may not charge the drawer's account for the amount.56
It remits its own funds, and the proceeds stay in the drawer's account.
The liability of a collecting bank for conversion of the proceeds arises,
according to the common law, when the true owner brings an action
against it. This action is deemed to be a ratification by the true owner
of the collection, and the payor-drawee may then charge the drawer's
account; the collecting bank, however, retains the proceeds, having re-
mitted its own funds to the forger, for the true owner has not ratified
the payment to the forger. Since the collecting bank retains the pro-
ceeds, it cannot assert the "defense" of section 3-419(3).
Circularity of the "Proceeds" Argument
The court's attempt to define section 3-419(3) "proceeds" in
terms of the common law ratification theory in order to resolve the is-
sue of a collecting bank's liability is, unfortunately, an exercise in
circular reasoning. This, in itself, does not condemn the decision, but
it does force one to look more closely at the opinion to see what the
court is really attempting to say. The circularity of the proceeds argu-
ment will be examined in order to assess the effects of this faulty rea-
soning on the holding as a whole.
Consider what happens to the proceeds chronologically, according
to the ratification theory, from the time the forger transfers the check
to the depositary for deposit to his account. Phase 1. The deposi-
tary gives the forger's account a provisional credit for the amount and
presents the check to the drawee for payment. The drawee-payor deb-
its the account of the drawer and forwards the amount of the check to
the depositary bank (clearing house credits are used in most transac-
tions). At this time of final settlement, the depositor firms up the
credit given to the forger, and becomes the debtor of the forger for
the amount, free to use the amount collected as its own. At this point,
however, the "proceeds" have never really left the drawer's account,
since the drawee has paid the wrong person. Phase I. The forger
withdraws his deposit accounts and leaves town. The true owner dis-
covers the forgery and sues the depositary bank. At this point, accord-
ing to the ratification theory, what the depositary bank received is now
the proceeds, which it holds for the true owner. But why are the pro-
ceeds now held in a discrete quantity for the true owner, instead of
being mingled with the depositary's other funds, as they were before
the forgery was discovered? The court answers this query by the con-
structive trust theory which allows the tracing of mingled funds.
5r
56. Id. § 4-401.
57. 9 Cal. 3d at 379, 507 P.2d at 615, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 7-8.
This is tantamount to saying that the collecting bank always retains the
proceeds because the court will impose a constructive trust on its assets
in the amount of the original proceeds of the check, and will then call
this amount the proceeds.
The only way to understand the proceeds argument is to see it as
an attempt to interpret section 3-419(3) in light of the fiction of con-
structive ratification of the collection of the proceeds. Since the ratifi-
cation theory always places the common law liability on the collecting
bank, it is fundamentally irreconcilable with the majority interpreta-
tion of the section, and any analysis of "proceeds" in terms of ratifica-
tion will always impose liability on the collecting bank, absent negli-
gence on the part of the true owner. The proceeds argument is there-
fore circular, because its premise is its conclusion. The entire pro-
ceeds analysis can be reduced to the following summary:
1. Is the collecting bank liable under section 3-419?
2. Yes, but only if it retains the proceeds of the check.
3. What are proceeds?
4. Proceeds, according to the common law, are funds construc-
tively retained by a collecting bank when it remits on a forged in-
dorsement and is sued by the true owner.
5. Since this bank remitted funds on a forged indorsement, and
was sued by the true owner, it must have retained the proceeds.
6. Therefore the bank is liable.
Professor Julius Stone, in his construct of "legal categories of illusory
reference," ' calls this type of reasoning "concealed circular refer-
ence," since "the vacuity is concealed by referring for the solution to a
mere reformulation of the question itself."" (The legal "category" in
this instance is "proceeds.") In assessing the implications of discov-
ering such an argument in a case, Professor Stone acknowledges that
the circular category "is strictly incapable of yielding any result,"'3"
yet he shows how to profit from the discovery:
In all such cases the present submission is not that the court's
decision is meaningless or even unsound . . . [but] simply that
if the legal category is meaningless from which the courts purport
to deduce their decision, the real ground of decision must be other
than this.61
The use of the common law definition of proceeds in Cooper to
interpret section 3-419(3) is an example of the use of a legal cate-
gory of "concealed circular reference." Considered alone, it cannot
meaningfully support the court's holding. The failure of the proceeds
58. J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS 235-300 (1964).
59. Id. at 258.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 246 (footnotes omitted).
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argument points out the need to look elsewhere than the word "pro-
ceeds" for a satisfactory interpretation of the section. Fortunately, the
court does not rely solely on a definition of proceeds for its holding.
Its analysis of the relation of collecting banks to transferor and, more
importantly, its inquiry into legislative intent, brief as it is, furnish
solid grounds for the decision.
Agency Status of Collecting Bank Not Retained
The court in Cooper seeks support for the thesis that section
3-419(3) should not apply to a collecting bank in the ordinary check
collection process in Jennings v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
62
Here, Mr. Justice Cardozo discusses "proceeds" in terms of general col-
lection theory and analyzes the rights that various parties may assert
over funds in the chain of the collection process. Cooper cites Jen-
nings only for the imprimatur it placed on the theory that in the ordi-
nary check collection transaction, upon final settlement of an item, a
collecting bank's agency status ends and it thereafter remits its own
funds as debtor to its customer and not as agent, whether it pays out
cash or credits the payee's deposit account.8
While borrowing Justice Cardozo's summary of the relevant com-
mon law may lend some prestige to the court's argument, the same
common law theory can be found embodied in the Code itself. Sec-
tion 4-201, entitled "Presumption and Duration of Agency Status of
Collecting Banks . . ." enacts the common law presumption that ab-
sent a clear, contrary intent the collecting bank is an agent of the own-
er of the item.64 The official comments indicate that this agency
terminates upon final settlement of the item.65 (Cooper recognizes
that this provision is in accord with Cardozo's view.) 6 The com-
ments show an acceptance by the Code of the principle that in a rou-
tine check collection transaction the collecting bank acts as debtor in
remitting the amount of the check to its creditor-customer.
This additional analysis by the court is an attempt to show that
section 3-419(3) should not be construed to exempt collecting banks
62. 294 U.S. 216, 219-20 (1935) (dictum).
63. 9 Cal. 3d at 378, 507 P.2d at 614, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
64. UIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-201(1).
65. Id. § 4-201, Comment 4. Settlement is final when the collecting bank re-
ceives final credit for the item from the payor bank. The California comment is even
more direct. CAL. COMM. CODE § 4201, Comment 1 (West 1964): "'The agency sta-
tus terminates when settlement is final. At this point the bank becomes the customer's
debtor." See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-213, Comment 9, for further dis-
cussion of the collecting bank's debtor status.
66. 9 Cal. 3d at 379, 507 P.2d at 615, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 7. Perhaps primary
emphasis is placed on Jennings rather than on § 4-201(1) because the presumption
in § 4-201(1) is not explicitly incorporated into the definitional scheme of Article 3.
See text accompanying note 50 supra.
from liability in conversion in the ordinary check collection transac-
tion, because these banks do not deal with the transferor as represen-
tatives, a basic prerequisite for exemption under the section. 67
The court has again turned to common law theory to explain
"representative" as it did to define "proceeds." For this explanation
of representative, however, there is ample corroboration in the Code
to support the court's position.
Legislative Intent
The court's strongest, though briefest, argument is its analysis
of the comments to section 3-419(3). A comparison of Cooper with
Ervin v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 8 which reaches the same result
with a similar fact situation, shows that the California court relied
more heavily on an analysis of "proceeds" and "representative" for its
holding, with several buttressing arguments based on legislative intent,
while Ervin relied primarily on the legislative intent, and secondarily
on a proceeds analysis. The reason for the different approach lies in
the quality of legislative materials available to each court to aid it in
construing the statute.
California Comment
The California legislature used peculiarly imprecise and inad-
67. This argument is epitomized in the following language: "Unlike the ordinary
bank collection transaction, in which the collecting bank and its customer have tacitly
agreed a debtor-creditor relationship will emerge upon collection, the ordinary agency
transaction gives rise to no such debt when the agent receives funds intended for the
principal. Such funds, instead of being mingled, must be kept separate from the agent's
own funds and identified as the property of the principal. Thus, when the true agent
remits the amount of an instrument to his customer, the agent actually does part with
the proceeds. It is to this kind of situation, rather than to the typical bank collection
transaction, that section 3419, subdivision (3) appears to be addressed." 9 Cal. 3d
at 382-83, 507 P.2d at 618, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
68. Ervin v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 473 (C.P. Dauphin Co.
1965) reached essentially the same result in its view of "proceeds" as did Cooper, but
without the gloss of Supreme Court dictum to help define "representative." It is per-
haps for this reason that Ervin has been so severely criticized, for example, in WHITE
& SUMMERS, supra note 30, at 505. In colorful language, the hornbook authors casti-
gate the manner in which Ervin interpreted § 3-419(3): "Perhaps those bankers whose
hands were doubtless at work in the drafting of 3-419(3) got what they deserved. If
the section be not dead it certainly is mortally wounded; one can only mourn that
Dauphin Trust Co. [Ervin] inflicted fatal wounds with such little grace. . . . Al-
though we deplore that mentality which leads a court to think it is completely free
to disregard legislative language, we appreciate the strength of the policy arguments
against the restrictions that the bankers presumably wrote into 3-419(3) . . . . (empha-
sis added)." Professors White and Summers would presumably argue that Cooper has
delivered the coup de grace to § 3-419(3). They would presumably also deplore simi-
lar mentality in the California court.
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equate wording in its comment to section 3-419(3), and refers to no
case law. The comment in its entirely reads:
Subdivision (3) is new statutory law. Its basic premise that
a person dealing in good faith with the property of another is not
liable for conversion is consistent with prior California law on the
tort of conversion.6 9
This would imply that "good faith" is the touchstone for general ex-
emption from liability in conversion, which is an erroneous charac-
terization of both California and general authority on conversion. The
general rule in California is that the innocent agent is liable for con-
version when he deals with goods for another, even though he acted in
good faith. 70 Although there are no cases on point in California, an
exception to this rule is recognized elsewhere in the case of certain
negotiable instruments when the agent who acts in good faith reliance
upon the legitimacy of his principal's claim to the paper sells the instru-
ment and remits the proceeds to his principal. 71 Since the California
comment is such an inaccurate and incomplete statement of prior com-
mon law, 72 it is not a very good basis for divining the legislature's in-
tent. The court seized on a very slim reed to support its position that
section 3-419(3) be construed in accordance with prior common law
on collecting bank liability in the phrase "consistent with prior Califor-
nia law on the tort of conversion."73  The California comment is
much too vague to indicate legislative intent, however, and the court
was compelled to turn to the drafters' intent as set forth in the official
comments. It is evident that the analysis in Ervin pointed the direc-
tion.
69. CAL. COMM. CODE § 3419, Comment 5 (West 1964). Prior versions of this
comment were even shorter. CAL. COMM'N ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, CAL. ANNO-
TATIONS TO THE PROPOSED UNIFORM COMM. CODE 51 (1960), Comment to § 3419
(3), reads: "Subdivision (3) is new." Id. at 50 (1952 ed.) reads: "Subsection (3)
is new law." An inspection of Sixth Progress Report to the Legislature by the Senate
Fact Finding Committee on Judiciary (1959-1961), Part I, the Uniform Commercial
Code, Report of Professors Harold Marsh Jr. and William D. Warren 436, 468 in 1
APPENDIx TO THE JOURNAL OF THE SENATE (1961) and California State Bar Commit-
tee on the Commercial Code, The Uniform Commercial Code, 37 CAL. ST. B.J. 119, 131-
32 (1962) reveals no comment as to the effect on California law of § 3419(3). The
four sources cited here comprise the total comment available in California legislative
studies of the proposed § 3419(3).
70. E.g., Wells Fargo Bank v. Dowd, 139 Cal. App. 2d 561, 575, 294 P.2d 159,
168 (1956); Weinberg v. Dayton Storage Co., 50 Cal. App. 2d 750, 756-57, 124 P.2d
155, 159. (1942) (dicta); 2 B. WimN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw 1320 (7th ed.
1960); cf. Booth v. People's Fin. & Thrift Co., 124 Cal. App. 131, 135, 12 P.2d 50,
51 (1932). See note 22 supra.
71. See note 25 supra.
72. It is interesting to note that the 1952 recommended comments (see note 69
supra), which were co-authored by Professor Prosser, did not contain the second, in-
accurate statement which appears in the present comment.
73. For a discussion of this argument, see text accompanying note 81 infra.
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Official Comment
In Ervin the court had the aid of specific legislative comment. 74
The section was to be interpreted in accord with a Pennsylvania case,
First National Bank v. Goldberg,5 where no liability was imposed on
an innocent broker who, in good faith, assisted in the sale of stolen
negotiable bonds and later remitted all the proceeds to his principal.
The Ervin court reasoned that section 3-419(3) should be applied only
to a depositary or collecting bank which had acted in the capacity of
an agent or broker, in accord with the legislative comment.
Although neither the California comments nor the official com-
ments to section 3-419(3) cite specific broker-agent exemption cases,
the state comments to the codes of Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, 76 and
New York7 7 include references to such cases78 within their respective
jurisdictions. Cooper cites these cases as the "decisions" referred to
in the official comment, 79 thereby incorporating their holdings into
the common law of California. Like the Ervin court, Cooper then in-
terprets section 3-419(3) as extending protection to the collecting bank
only when it acts as broker or true agent in accordance with the bro-
ker-agent cases.8s
In turning to the broker-agent cases the court was finally able to
draw on solid case law to interpret 3-419(3). The most compelling
legislative intent argument, however, which the court presents in sup-
port of its holding is its simple observation: "Had such substantial
74. 12A PENN. STAT. ANN. § 3-419, Penn. Bar. Ass'n Notes (1953), § (3)
(1970).
75. 340 Pa. 337, 17 A.2d 377 (1941). This is the common law exemption re-
ferred to in text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
76. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 106, § 3-419(3), Mass. Code Comment (1958).
77. N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-419(3), N.Y. Annotations § 3 (McKinney 1964).
78. Pratt v. Higginson, 230 Mass. 256, 119 N.E. 661 (1918); Gruntal v. National
Sur. Co., 254 N.Y. 468, 173 N.E. 682 (1930); First Nat'l Bank v. Goldberg, 340 Pa.
337, 17 A.2d 377 (1941).
79. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-419, Comment 5 (emphasis added). "Sub-
section (3), which is new, is intended to adopt the rule of decisions which has held
that a representative, such as a broker or depositary batk, who deals with a negotiable
instrument for his principal in good faith is not liable to the true owner for conversion
of the instrument or otherwise, except that he may be compelled to turn over to the
true owner the instrument itself or any proceeds of the instrument remaining in his
hands ....
80. 9 Cal. 3d at 382-83, 507 P.2d at 618, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 10. _But see 2 NEw
YORK LAw REvIsION COMMISSION FOR 1955 STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 1079, 1081-83 (1955). The commission's analysis supports the assumption that
§ 3-419(3) applies to collecting banks in their collection of checks paid on forged in-
dorsements, although it acknowledges that Gruntal v. National Sur. Co., 254 N.Y. 468,
173 N.E. 682 (1930), has never been applied in the case of a collecting bank. Kessler,
supra note 10, at 874 n.49, suggests that "an extension of the rule in Pratt v. Higgin-
son, 230 Mass. 256, 119 N.E. 661 (1918), to protect a collecting agent is not impos-
sible,"
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and controversial deviation from prior law been intended, moreover, it
could be expected that the official commentary to section 3-419 would
have so stated and would have included extensive explanation of the
reasons for the change."'81 A brief look at the comment to subsec-
tion (1) (c) suggests the rationale for this statement. This comment
states explicitly that section 3-419(1) (c) will reverse California law in
providing the payee with an action directly against the payor bank in
conversion. -8 2  Surely, if 3-419(3) were intended to deprive the payee
for all practical purposes of his direct action against the collecting
bank, consistency would compel the legislature to so indicate. It is
entirely possible that even if 3-419(3) had been designed by the
drafters to relieve the collecting banks of liability, the legislature may
not have realized the full significance of the language and did not in-
tend the result the drafters had envisioned. When one considers the
sheer bulk and complexity of the Uniform Commercial Code, which was
enacted in toto, a lapse of this kind on the part of the legislature is en-
tirely possible. The court has presented a convincing reading of the
legislative comment as indicating that no drastic change in the law
was intended.
Scope of the Exemption in California after Cooper
While Cooper may dispose of the question in California regard-
ing collecting bank liability, it leaves unanswered an important ques-
tion:83 if the exemption does not apply to collecting banks in the
normal collection process, but does apply to "true agents remitting pro-
ceeds," in what situation does a collecting or depositary bank act as a
true agent? Moreover, in using the general term "instrument" instead
of the more limited "bearer instrument" in its discussion of the exemp-
tion,8 4 has the court approved a wider reading of the broker exemption
to include protection to agents who remit funds on forged indorsements?
The following hypthetical situation will illustrate the possible
ramifications of such a position. An Attorney acts as renting agent
for his client, Landlord. Attorney receives five rent checks, indorses
them "Attorney, as agent for Landlord," deposits the checks in a sep-
arate account (not his personal account) in Depositary Bank, and re-
mits the rent proceeds to Landlord by one check drawn on the separate
account. One of the five rent checks was a paycheck drawn on Drawee
Bank, payable to the order of Mary Doe. The renter who remitted
this check to the Attorney had stolen it from Mary Doe, forged her
indorsement, and added the words "pay to the order of Attorney, as
81. 9 Cal. 3d at 382, 507 P.2d at 617, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 9-10.
82. CAL. COMM. CODE § 3419, Cal. Code Comment 3 (West 1964).
83. The answer would be dictum, of course, since the question was not pregented
by the facts.
84. See note 67 supra.
agent for Landlord." Under dicta in Cooper, section 3-419(3) would
exempt agent Attorney from liability in conversion to Mary Doe, since
he has fulfilled the necessary conditions set forth in the section.
(Under the Restatement illustration, Attorney would be liable to
Mary Doe, since he cannot transfer title to Landlord.) 5 Deposi-
tary Bank's liability would be in accordance with pre-Code law: when
Mary Doe, payee-true owner, brings an action in conversion against
Depositary Bank,8" Depositary is deemed to have collected the proceeds
by the ratification doctrine, and to have remitted its own funds to At-
torney agent. Depositary may debit Attorney's account for the amount
of the bad check, or sue him on the warranty theory, 87 and may or
may not recover the amount, but Depositary is still liable to Mary
Doe for the proceeds of her check, which Cooper says Depositary con-
structively retains. Depositary would be liable under the warranty
theory to Drawee bank, absent ratification of the collection of the
proceeds from Drawee which would occur when Mary Doe sues
Depositary.
Conclusion
The decision in Cooper is not the product of a mentality that felt
it was completely free to disregard the legislative language, as Profes-
sors Summers and White presumably would argue.88 It is, rather, a type
of judicial law making entirely appropriate under the circum-
stances. The distinction made by J. Cohen 89 between desirable and
undesirable judicial "law-making" in his study of statutory interpreta-
tion illustrates this conclusion. Cooper presents the type of situation
described in this summary by Julius Stone of Professor Cohen's distinc-
tion:
[A third type of situation exists] where there is neither clarity of
language and purpose, nor a conscious delegation, but simple
vagueness or ambiguity, or internal inconsistency of language,
affecting the statutory words. In this, as distinct from the first
two kinds, the judicial search is for legislative meaning, and thus
for legislative policy. The judicial task in cases of this third kind
is to mend the legislative expression so as to yield a solution that
can reasonably be attributed to the legislature, whether by surface
search of the syntax, by reading in the context of the whole stat-
ute, or by probing for a principle which the statute expresses, or for
hints of the legislator's purpose, consciously or unconsciously held
by him. 90
85. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
86. She may also sue the drawee-payor.
87. See note 48 supra.
88. See note 68 supra.
89. Cohen, Judicial "Legisputation" and the Dimensions of Legislative Meaning, 36
IND. L.J. 414 (1961).
90. J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS 353 (1964).
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The internal inconsistencies in section 3-419(3), compounded by in-
accurate and contradictory legislative comment, threw upon the court the
burden of finding a reasonable solution. In the absence of any legisla-
tive indication that the section was designed to significantly rearrange
the liabilities of the parties to a forged indorsement except the explicit
change allowing the true owner an action directly against the payor,
the court was compelled to construe the section in light of the com-
mon law, and to reaffirm the traditional liability of a collecting bank.
The court achieved a reasonable solution in terms of fundamentally
sound policy.
The result of this decision to the innocent true owner is to guar-
antee to him the pre-Code action against the collecting bank. Consid-
ered together with the new action against the payor granted by section
3-419(l)(c), the result is a broader remedy for the true owner than
he had before the enactment of the Code. The true owner may sue
either the depositary, an intermediary, or the payor, whichever is most
convenient for him under the circumstances: he chooses the remedy
which is the simplest for him. In the case of a single payor and multi-
ple depositaries, it will be more convenient to sue the payor. In cases
like Cooper where there are many payors and relatively few deposi-
taries, the only plausible defendant for the true owner to sue is the de-
positary bank; this action is preserved.91 The leeway given the
true owner is in accord with the common law principle of protecting the
innocent true owner in such a situation at the expense of the depositary
bank, which can insure against loss and spread the risk over all its
customers.92
The result to the depositary and collecting bank is to continue
the settled commercial law in California.93  While there may be some
policy justification in absolving an innocent nondepositary collecting
bank (intermediary) 94 from liability, to extend a blanket exemption to
91. The true owner must elect his remedy, of course, since it is clear that the
proceeds follow the suit, under the ratification doctrine, and the proceeds cannot be
in two or three places at once.
92. See Kessler, supra note 10, at 895.
93. While the situation may arise where the collecting bank will be simultane-
ously sued by the true owner in conversion and the payor bank for breach of warranty,
double liability can be avoided by pleading one of the suits in bar to the other.
94. An interesting issue should be noted here. Does the holding in Cooper apply
to intermediary-collecting banks as well as depositary-collecting banks, in view of the
fact that no intermediary banks were involved in the litigation in Cooper? The court,
of course, uses the generic term "collecting bank" in stating its holding. This term, as
defined in the Code, includes both depositaries and intermediaries. And, of course,
section 3-419(3) combines the two types of banks in its wording. It is submitted,
however, that the answer to this question goes to the heart of the rationale of the
case: liability for conversion is predicated on the fact of collecting and holding the
proceeds-constructively or otherwise-and not on the fact of accepting a forged in-
dorsement in the role of depositary. Since an intermediary can also collect and hold
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all collecting banks, including depositaries, would drastically reduce the
protection hitherto afforded the innocent payee, whose simplest rem-
edy (and in many cases, only remedy) is against the depositary. The
court has not been unduly harsh to the collecting or payor banks, how-
ever. The rigid common law rule of absolute liability has been grad-
ually mitigated by recognizing the negligence of the true owner as
an estoppel defense to the collecting and payor bank, and the suc-
cess of this defense in Cooper, partially limiting the plaintiff's recovery,
shows the court is willing to take a close look at the actions of the
true owner.
The result to the "true" agent is not clear; dictum suggests that
section 3-419 extends the broker exemption to all agents dealing with
negotiable instruments, including depositary and collecting banks when
they act as "true" agents. Whether this is sound policy is questioned.
Since the original purpose of the broker exemption was to enhance mar-
ketability of negotiable securities, the extention of this exemption to sit-
uations where marketability is not needed seems unwise and threatens
the special protection the common law has traditionally given to the
true owner of an order instrument.
California's treatment of section 3-419 will undoubtedly be
closely studied by courts in other jurisdictions. If reliance is placed
by them on an examination of the term "proceeds" for a satisfactory
result, however, these courts will be involving themselves in a fruitless
struggle. The better approach is to examine the legislative intent; un-
less a clear intent appears to limit drastically the true owner's right of
action against the collecting bank, the court should preserve this right
in its interpretation of section 3-419(3).
Donald Lincoln Vance*
proceeds, under the common law ratification doctrine, it too must be liable under the
holding in Cooper.
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